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Empirical studies quantifying the beneﬁts of increased foreign direct investment (FDI) have been
unable to provide conclusive evidence of a positive impact on the host country’s economic perfor-
mance. I show that the lack of robust evidence is not inconsistent with theory, even if the gains to
FDI openness are large. Anticipated welfare gains to increased inward FDI should lead to imme-
diate declines in domestic investment and employment and eventual increases. Furthermore, since
part of FDI is intangible investment that is expensed from company proﬁts, gross domestic product
(GDP) and gross national product (GNP) should decline during periods of abnormally high FDI
investment. Using the model of McGrattan and Prescott (2009) and data from the IMF Balance
of Payments to parameterize the time paths of FDI openness for each country in the sample, I do
not ﬁnd an economically signiﬁcant relationship between the amount of inward FDI a country did
over the period 1980—2005 and the growth in real GDP predicted by the model. This ﬁnding rests
crucially on the fact that most of these countries are still in transition to FDI openness.
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Empirical studies quantifying the beneﬁts of increased foreign direct investment (FDI) have
been unable to provide conclusive evidence of a positive impact on host country’s economic
performance. Kose, Prasad, Rogoﬀ, and Wei (2009) provide a survey of empirical cross-
country studies and report that only one ﬁnds a positive link between FDI and growth in
per capita GDP. Critics of capital account liberalizations have used the empirical results
to argue that lower restrictions on capital movements provide little beneﬁts but could
generate signiﬁcant volatility in developing economies.
This paper reconsiders the empirical ﬁndings in light of the theory of McGrattan and
Prescott (2008, 2009) which predicts large gains to FDI openness, especially for small
countries integrating with larger countries or with a union of other countries. Speciﬁcally,
I derive the properties of equilibrium paths for a multicountry general equilibrium model
following the announcement of lower restrictions on FDI at a speciﬁed future date. Coun-
tries in this analysis are assumed to diﬀer only in size, where size depends not only on a
country’s population but also on its level of technology. A country is small if it has few
people or a low level of technology or both.
Of particular interest is the path of a small country that commits to a policy of low-
ering restrictions on FDI. In the model I analyze, if there is a gradual lowering of capital
restrictions, the paths of per capita GDP and employment fall below historical trends and
do not recover until barriers have fallen suﬃciently. The declines occur as soon as the
government announces its intent to lower FDI restrictions because households immedi-
ately raise consumption and leisure in response to higher permanent income. The lower
restrictions on FDI in the future imply a higher eﬀective level of total factor productivity
(TFP).
1A second factor aﬀecting the path of GDP is intangible investment that is expensed
and therefore not counted in gross product. When multinationals make intangible invest-
ments in subsidiaries abroad, the host country’s proﬁts are lower and their GDP is lower.
Theory predicts that these investments are abnormally high as barriers to FDI are lifted,
implying a negative correlation between FDI investment and host country GDP.
If there are restrictions on portfolio investments that are relaxed after countries open
to foreign FDI investment, the transitional patterns change but the main conclusions to
be drawn do not.1 Consumption in the small country rises gradually prior to the lifting of
capital controls and then jumps once the policy change takes place. As in the case with no
portfolio restrictions, FDI investment is negatively correlated with GDP because the small
country is making large intangible investments. Thus, care must be taken when studying
world-wide capital ﬂows that appear to be ﬂowing in the wrong direction.2
To determine the quantitative signiﬁcance of my results, I parameterize a 50-country
version of the model using data from the IMF’s Balance of Payments and the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. Countries chosen for the exercise have complete data on
inward FDI, GDP, and populations over the period 1980-2005. Observations on direct
investments are used to parameterize time paths of country openness parameters, which
are policy parameters determining the inﬂow of foreign investment. The model is simulated
and growth in GDP per capita computed.
In the 50-country version of the model, parametrized to generate FDI ﬂows comparable
1 Most of the theoretical literature on capital account liberalization focuses on portfolio investment
and the integration of countries with diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems at diﬀerent stages of ﬁnancial de-
velopment. Recent examples include Caballero et al. (2008), Mendoza et al. (2009), and Aoki et
al. (2006).
2 Using international accounts for the period 1980–2000, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2008) show that
countries with lower GDP and TFP growth receive most of the capital inﬂows, which is inconsistent
with the neoclassical growth model. Here, I show that this ﬁnding is not inconsistent with the
neoclassical growth model extended to include intangible capital.
2to those reported by the IMF, I ﬁnd no evidence of strong positive beneﬁts to FDI when
I conduct an empirical analysis typical of the literature. In contrast to Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006), however, the failure to ﬁnd beneﬁts here is not due to the fact that the
theoretical gains to openness are small. The potential gains to openness are large in the
model I analyze, but the main theoretical prediction of the model implies that the gains
are only evident once countries have passed a particular threshold when lowering their
capital restrictions.3
Section 2 lays out a model which has a central role for FDI. Section 3 is a set of
propositions about the pattern of transition of a small country joining a larger ﬁnancially
integrated union. In Section 3, I also demonstrate that the shifts in aggregate activity are
large for plausible parameterizations of the model. Section 4 is an application of the model
based on data from the IMF. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
In this section, I describe a version of the multicountry general equilibrium model of Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2009).4 I ﬁrst describe the technologies available to multinationals
and then the problems faced by households in the diﬀerent countries.
2.1. Multinationals
Multinationals from country j operating in country i produce output Y
j














3 A recent literature has begun to explore such thresholds. See for example Kose, Prasad, and Taylor
(2009).
4 I do not distinguish between equity and debt portfolio income of households, I use constant tax rates,
and I abstract from nonbusiness activity.
3with technology capital M
j
t and a composite of country-speciﬁc inputs denoted by Z
j
it.5
Technology capital is accumulated know-how from investments in R&D, brands, and or-
ganizational capital that can be used in as many locations as ﬁrms choose, both at home
and abroad. The total number of locations available in country i at time t is Nit and ﬁrms
take this as given in solving their optimization problem. Since technology capital can be
used simultaneously in multiple locations, it is not indexed by i. The span of control of
this organizational capital is limited due to the fact that countries are assumed to have a
ﬁxed number of production locations.
Country i’s technology level in t is denoted by Ait. For countries incorporated outside
i, the eﬀective technology level if they operate in i is Aiσi, where σi is the degree of
openness of country i to foreign direct investment. A value for σi of 1 implies that the
country is totally open—so domestic and foreign ﬁrms have the same opportunities. A
value of less than 1 implies that domestic and foreign ﬁrms are not treated equally. In
particular, there are costs to foreign ﬁrms, and these costs have the same eﬀect as if they
had lower TFP than domestic ﬁrms.



















with inputs of tangible capital, K
j
T,i, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, K
j
I,i, and labor L
j
i.
This speciﬁcation of technology implies that multinationals use two types of intangible
capital, one that is plant-speciﬁc and one that is not.
5 See McGrattan and Prescott (2008) for a micro-foundation of this aggregate production function.








where dividends are the sum of dividends across all operations in all countries indexed by
































i = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, X
j
I,i is investment in plant-speciﬁc capital which is split
among locations in country i that j operates, and X
j
M is the technology capital investment
of multinational j used in all locations in which j operates.6 The multinational takes as
given sequences of prices pt and wages Wit. The same wage rate is paid by all multinationals
operating in i.







T,it). Taxable proﬁts are equal to sales less expenses, where the
expenses are wage payments, tangible depreciation, and expensed investments on plant-
speciﬁc intangible capital and technology capital. Taxable proﬁts in country i are taxed
at rate τpi. The capital stocks of the multinational next period are given by
K
j



















6 McGrattan and Prescott (2009) assume that all dividends are taxed at the same rate. If not, one has
to account for clientele eﬀects.
52.2. Households
In each period t, households in i choose how much to consume Cit, how much total labor
to supply Lit, and how much to borrow from abroad, Bi,t+1 − Bi,t. Without loss of
generality, I assume that households in i own all of the equity shares of multinational ﬁrms
incorporated in i and thus foreign borrowing and lending residually determines their net














(1 − τli)WitLit + (1 − τd)D
i
t + rbtBit + κit
￿
,
where the total population in i is assumed to be proportional to the total number of
locations Nit. Without loss of generality I assume a constant of proportionality of 1
between the number of people and the number of production locations within a country.
Households take the sequence of returns on portfolio income, rbt, wage rates Wit, prices,
pt, and government transfers, κit, as given. Labor is not mobile across countries, but can
be supplied to domestic or foreign companies. Taxes are levied on labor at rate τli and
dividends at rate τd.7
2.3. Competitive Equilibrium



















Mt}, that are consistent with the
maximization problems of multinationals and households. In addition, markets must clear.
7 Given taxes are constant, I combine taxes on consumption and labor into the labor wedge τli.

































These conditions along with household budget constraints above imply that government
transfers in country i satisfy

















Before deriving properties of the competitive equilibrium, I need to describe how to
construct national accounting statistics for the model which are the inputs in the empirical
studies surveyed by Kose, Prasad, Rogoﬀ, and Wei (2009).
2.4. Accounting Measures
In this section, I describe how to construct the relevant accounting measures for the model.
Gross domestic product (GDP) for country i at date t is given by





T,it + NXit, (2.7)
where NXi is net exports of goods and services by country i. Consumption and investment
include both private and public expenditures. Intangible investments are expensed and
7therefore are not included in the measure of GDP. In other words, GDP is not a measure
of total output.
To see this, consider a second way of calculating GDP, namely to add up all domestic
incomes. Speciﬁcally, if we sum up compensation of households (WiLi), total before-tax












T,i), we have GDP from the income side:







This has to be equal to product in (2.7). From (2.7) and (2.8), it is easy to calculate
net exports as total output produced in country i less the sum of consumption and all
investments.
Given that we are interested in measurement, it is worth noting that GDP for country
i, as deﬁned in (2.8), is not a measure of production of country i in the model economy.
In the model economy, total production in country i is Yi. GDP is lower because some
investments are expensed.
Next, consider adding ﬂows to and from other countries. The BEA’s measure of gross
national product (GNP) is the sum of GDP plus net factor income from abroad. Net








T,lt} + max(rbtBit,0). (2.9)
Analogously, net factor payments (NFP) from i to the rest of the world are the sum of
FDI income of foreign aﬃliates in i sent back to foreign parents, and portfolio incomes of
8 Equity holdings are categorized by the BEA as direct investment when the ownership exceeds 10
percent. Otherwise they are categorized as portfolio income.







T,it} + max(−rbtBit,0). (2.10)
Adding net factor income to net exports and to GDP, we have the current account (CA)
and GNP, respectively:
CAit = NXit + NFRit − NFPit (2.11)
GNPit = GDPit + NFRit − NFPit. (2.12)
In the balance of payments, the current account must be equal to the ﬁnancial account


















+ Bit+1 − Bit, (2.13)
where the ﬁrst term is net FDI investment by multinationals from i abroad, the second term
is the (negative) of net new investment by foreigners operating in i, and the third term is
new portfolio acquisitions by households from i. Empirical studies report regressions of per
capita growth of GDP on FDI investment (or FDI investment relative to some measure of
aggregate output), controlling for changes in other variables. The right hand side variable
is the second term of (2.13).
3. Equilibrium Paths in Theory
In this section, I examine the properties of the equilibrium paths as the degree of openness
(σ) changes for a world with two countries. The two countries diﬀer only in their size, where
size is deﬁned to be NitA
1− (1− φ)(αT+ αI)
it for country i. One interpretation of the exercise is
a small country joining a union of countries that are already ﬁnancially integrated. The
9joiner is called “small” if it has few people or a low technology level relative to the union
it is joining.
3.1. Qualifying the eﬀects
In this section, I qualify the eﬀects of increased FDI by proving several propositions about
the equilibrium paths. Propositions 1–3 assume no restrictions on borrowing and lending
and Proposition 4 assumes that Bt+1 = 0 for t = 1,...,t∗.
In Figure 1, I display the path of the degree of openness that I’ll use for the propositions
that follow. I assume it is the same for both countries. The policy σ∗
it is announced in
t = 1, and the restrictions are lifted in t = t∗ + 1. I’ll assume that Nit = Ni(1 + γN)t
and Ait = Ai(1 + γA)t for some ﬁxed Ni and Ai. All results will be described in terms
of historical trends where γN is the common trend growth rate in populations and γA
is the common trend growth trend rate in technologies. The historical trend is assumed
to be consistent with no borrowing or lending and therefore Bi0 = 0 for the equilibrium
described below.
In order to make precise statements about the equilibrium paths, I make two additional
assumptions. The ﬁrst concerns σit: at t = 0, the countries are completely closed to each
other’s FDI (σi0 = 0), and at t = t∗ + 1, σ∗
it is high enough so that the small country
does not ﬁnd it optimal to make any further expenditures in technology capital (Xi
M,t = 0
for t > t∗ with i indexing the small country).9 The second assumption is that foreign
households receive a very small amount of income denoted by ǫt between periods t = 1
and t = t∗. The income stream is such that rb,t+1 is constant in equilibrium prior to
9 The patterns do not change for σi0 > 0 as long as it is below a particular threshold.
10t∗.10 I show below that this “trick” allows me to make very precise statements about
a complicated dynamic path in an economy that is so close to the economy of interest
(with ǫt = 0) that the paths cannot be distinguished when graphed. I refer to this related
economy as the ǫ-economy.
Proposition 1. The small country’s output and labor in the ǫ-economy are below their
historical trend between t = 1 and t = t∗.
Proof. Let xit = Xit/(1 + γY )t where
γY = (1 + γN)
1−(1−φ)(αT +αI)
(1−φ)(1−αT −αI) (1 + γA)
1
(1−φ)(1−αT −αI) − 1
is trend growth rate of all variables that grow with the exception of labor inputs; labor
inputs grow at rate γN. Unless otherwise noted, i indexes the small country.
At t = 1, detrended consumption cit in the small country rises relative to its historical
trend, ci1 > ci0, because the value of the country’s endowment is higher given eﬀective
TFP is higher in the future, and households want to smooth their consumption over time.
Between t = 2 and t = t∗, cit = ci1 because rbt is constant (by choice of {ǫt}). To
be consistent with the intertemporal condition for asset holdings, this rate has to equal
(1+γy)/β−1 where γy is the rate of growth of per capita consumption, γy = (1+γY )/(1+
γN) − 1.











, t = 1...t∗. (3.1)
10 In the numerical experiments shown later, the income needed to have a constant rate of return is on
average about one-tenth of one percent of income. If the additional income is set equal zero, the rate
of return is approximately, but not exactly, constant.
11The ﬁrst equality in (3.1) follows from the fact that countries are initially closed and all
labor in i is therefore supplied to domestic companies and all output in i is produced by
domestic companies. With capital stocks initially ﬁxed and consumption higher in period
t = 1, it must be the case that li1 < li0 and yi1 < yi0 if (3.1) holds. With capital ﬁxed, it
must also be the case that labor falls by more than output in t = 1.
In period t = 2, output and labor must fall further because domestic capital stocks
fall between the ﬁrst and second periods. To see this, note that the capital-output ratio is
pinned down by the return rbt. If this return in the second period is equal to (1+γy)/β−1,
then the capital-output ratios have to be equal to their historical levels (at t = 0). Using
this fact along with the production technologies, it follows that labor productivity in
the second period must also be at its historical level. It then follows from (3.1) that
yi2 < yi1 and li2 < li1 since the labor productivity in the second period is below the labor
productivity in the ﬁrst period.
Since the return does not change between t = 2 and t∗, the same logic as above can
be used to show that yit = yi2 and lit = li2, t ≤ t∗.
The proof is constructive in that it implies speciﬁc patterns for the key macroeconomic
aggregates. Consumption in the small country rises at the announcement of the new policy
but stays ﬂat until the change occurs. At that point, it will increase further because
worldwide output will be higher. At the announcement of the union, labor and output
fall for two periods and then remain ﬂat until the policy change occurs. The economy
will appear to be immediately depressed. The beginning-of-period domestic capital stocks
fall for one period and then remain ﬂat. After t = 1 and prior to the policy change,
capital-output ratios and labor productivity remain at their historical trends.
12With multinationals investing in intangible capital, the relevant measure of economic
performance is not output but rather GDP or GNP.
Proposition 2. The small country’s GDP and GNP in the ǫ-economy initially rise above
their historical trends and fall below trend between t = 2 and t = t∗.
Proof. Recall the deﬁnitions of GDP and GNP in (2.8) and (2.12), respectively. In the
ﬁrst period, when the policy in announced, net factor incomes for the period are already
determined, and therefore GNP must be equal to GDP. To show that both are above
their historical trend in t = 1, I have to show that intangible investments fall by more
than output since GDP is deﬁned as output less the sum of investment in plant-speciﬁc




































where the ﬁrst equality uses the capital accumulation equation after detrending all vari-
ables, the second equality follows from the fact that the capital-output in the second period
is equal to the historical capital-output ratio, and the third equality follows from Propo-
sition 1. Since δI ≤ 1, it must be the case that plant-speciﬁc intangible investment falls
by more than output. The same argument can be made for technology capital. Therefore
GDP and GNP are both above trend in t = 1.
In the second period, since the capital-output ratios are at their historical trends, it
must be the case that GDP in the small country is below its own trend by the same amount
13as output. At t = t∗, GDP falls further below its historical trend than output has fallen
because investment of foreign multinationals in both tangible and plant-speciﬁc intangible
rises above zero. GDP is lower because of the rise in plant-speciﬁc intangible.
The path of GNP depends on the path of borrowing and lending from abroad. The
small country’s budget constraint and information about the other aggregates can be used
to determine that the small country receives portfolio income only for t = 2 and pays
portfolio income to foreigners after that period. This implies that GNP is below GDP
after that period. It further implies that GNP is below trend.
Proposition 3. At t = t∗, the small country’s FDI investment from abroad in the ǫ-economy
increases above its historical trend of zero.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that tangible capital from abroad earns a
positive rate of return in t = t∗ and multinationals gain from increased FDI abroad.
Next, I consider the case with Bt+1 = 0, t = 1,...,t∗. With σt = 0, the two economies
are eﬀectively closed and changes in the time series are due to the anticipation of future
relaxation of the capital accounts.
Proposition 4. The small country’s output and labor in the case of full capital account
restrictions are below their historical trend between t = 1 and t = t∗.
Proof. At t = 1, detrended consumption in the small country rises relative to its historical
trend, ci1 > ci0, because the country’s endowment is now higher. From the intratemporal
ﬁrst-order condition of households in (3.1), it follows that labor and output fall initially
14(between t = 0 and t = 1) and, with capital ﬁxed, it is the case that labor falls by more
than output.
With no borrowing or lending across countries, total investment yi1 − ci1 falls. With
returns equated across assets, it must be the case that investment in all three assets—
namely tangible capital, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, and technology capital—all fall.
In period t = 2, output and labor must fall further because domestic capital stocks
fall between the ﬁrst and second periods. Since households cannot borrow from abroad,
output, investment, and labor continue to fall until t = t∗, and net exports remain equal
to zero until the restrictions on FDI are lifted.
Regardless of whether there are restrictions on portfolio investment, the rise in FDI
investment from abroad is coincident with the drop in GDP. The path of openness chosen
for the analysis here is very stark, but it is easy to demonstrate numerically that if σit
rises more smoothly than shown in Figure 1, the general pattern that emerges is one of
abnormally low GDP during periods when FDI investment is abnormally high.
3.2. Quantifying the eﬀects
To demonstrate that the depression of per capita GDP and labor in the small economy
is potentially large, consider parameters of Table 1 taken from McGrattan and Prescott’s
(2009) model based on U.S. data.11 In addition, I assume that the relative size of the big
country to the small country is 10 and a period is equal to 5 years.
In Figure 2, I plot output and labor for the small country. In this ﬁgure and all that
follow I display the results for the economy with ǫt = 0 for all t in order to demonstrate
11 Averages are used for any time-varying exogenous parameters.
15that the patterns derived above for the ǫ-economy are the same as those shown in the
ﬁgures for the economy of interest. In particular, notice that in t = 1, labor falls further
below its historical trend than output. In t = 2, they both fall even further and stay low
until the policy is actually implemented. For the parameters of Table 1, the decline is
large. The economy is just over 80 percent of its historical trend between the time the
policy is announced and the time it is implemented.
In Figure 3, I plot consumption relative to its historical trend. Notice that at t = 1,
consumption jumps up 8 percent and stays there until t > t∗. At the time of the policy
change, consumption grows steadily to its new level (relative to trend) which is about 10
percent above the historical trend.
In Figure 4, end-of-period capital stocks are shown. Initially, all drop to just over
80 percent of their historical trend level, as with output and labor. When the policy
change occurs, investment in the technology capital of the domestic companies ceases. At
this point, it becomes optimal to let foreign multinationals invest in technology capital.
Total tangible and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital stocks rise due to the fact that foreign
companies are now investing in the small country.
Output shown in Figure 1 includes investment in intangible. In Figure 5, I show
GDP and GNP which are accounting measures and commonly used to assess an economy’s
economic performance. As the propositions above show, both GDP and GNP are above
trend initially. In t = 2, GDP is down by the same amount as true output and stays
constant relative to its historical trend until intangible investment by foreign multinationals
rises signiﬁcantly. GNP falls throughout the pre-liberalization period because the small
country is paying portfolio income to households abroad.
16Another standard accounting measure used to assess an economy’s economic perfor-








where KT,it is the total tangible capital in country i. Like GDP, total factor productivity
is low when intangible investments are high. Thus, care must be taken when diagnosing
economies with low or slow-growing GDP and TFP.
In Figure 6, I display foreign direct investment by foreign multinationals relative to
output in the small country. For the model, the FDI investment by foreign multinationals
is summarized by the second term in (2.13), which is the net investment in tangible capital.
What is clear is this investment is very high when GDP is very low. The reason is simple:
FDI is high because foreign tangible investment is high, GDP is low because foreign plant-
speciﬁc intangible investment is high, and both investments are high when countries are
open to FDI.
In Table 2, I show how the results change as I change the relative size of countries, the
maximal degree of openness, the share of income that goes to technology capital, and the
economy’s tax rates. If either the relative size or maximal degree of openness increases,
the swings in GDP, GNP, and labor are even larger than in the baseline parameterization.
This is shown in the columns marked “Higher relative size” and “Higher σ∗.” If technology
capital plays a small role (lower φ), a larger threshold for σ∗ is needed to get the same
results as the baseline case. This is shown in the column marked “Higher σ∗, Lower φ.”
Finally, I show that the level of tax rates is not crucial to the results as long as a ψ is set
in a way to get the same fraction of time at work.
Figure 7 shows how the path of GDP changes as I vary t∗. In the case of t∗ = 1,
17foreign investment is made in the same period as the policy change is announced. GDP
is low in the ﬁrst period because of the increase in intangible investments by foreign
multinationals. It is high the next period because TFP is now eﬀectively higher. I show
two other intermediate cases with t∗ = 3 and t∗ = 5. As I showed above, GDP is always
higher than trend in the period of the policy announcement and below trend until t = t∗.
In terms of the quantitative predictions based on parameters of Table 1, the sequence of
paths show that GDP per capita falls to a level in the range of 55 to 75 percent of its
pre-liberalized level, with the value depending on the delay between policy announcement
and policy change. Once barriers are lowered, GDP per capita is higher than the historical
level by about 30 percent. The length of delay does aﬀect the long-run trend, but only
modestly.
In Figures 8 and 9, I compare the equilibrium paths of GDP and consumption for the
case with no restrictions on portfolio investment and the case with restrictions on portfolio
investment. As the propositions make clear, the transitions are aﬀected by the households
ability to borrow from abroad. If they cannot, adjustments are slow prior to t = t∗, but
adjust rapidly when restrictions on FDI are lifted.
In the simulation shown, the capital account liberalization assumes that FDI is lib-
eralized ﬁrst (in 1995) and portfolio investment second (in 2000). If the two types of
investment are simultaneously liberalized, the decline in GDP at t = t∗ would be larger
than shown in Figure 8, and the change in consumption would be smaller than shown in
Figure 9.
Thus far, I have considered very stark examples that allow me to be precise about
the equilibrium behavior in the model. Next, I consider more realistic choices for the time
paths of {σit}.
184. Equilibrium Paths in Data
In this section, I analyze transition paths of a 50-country version of the model and show
that the theoretical ﬁndings are supported in a more realistic application of the model.
Inputs in the model are chosen so that the model generates certain features of time series
taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments and the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators over the period 1980–2005. (See Appendix A for details on data sources.) The
choice of 50 countries is dictated by data availability for the balance of payments. Countries
are assumed to diﬀer in size and in their levels of openness. As before, size depends on
both population and TFP. Here, I assume that populations change over time, consistently
with observed populations in the sample, and TFP is constant and set so that 1980 per
capita GDPs (normalized by the U.S. level) are the same in the model and data.12 (See
McGrattan (2009) for the speciﬁc inputs used in the 50-country version of the model.)
Remaining parameters are set as before and are reported in Table 1.13
In Figure 10, I show the initial and ﬁnal values of the openness parameters σit for the
50 countries. To give some idea of the implied ratios of FDI to GDP, I put countries into
two groups: one with the share less than 2 percent and one with it greater. The ﬁgure
shows that these parameters are not the only relevant input for the average ratio of inward
FDI to GDP. Another important input is country size. To see this, consider the path of
σit for the United States. The model predicts a relatively low—less than 2 percent—ratio
of inward FDI to GDP despite the fact that the U.S. openness parameters are relatively
high. For the United States, the initial level of σit is 0.77 and it eventually rises to 0.89
(which is the point at the upper right corner of the graph). For almost all other countries,
12 Measured TFPs do vary since they depend on time paths of technology capital.
13 For numerical reasons, I modify the model slightly, allowing for small quadratic costs of adjust-
ing capital stocks. This avoids numerical diﬃculties due to binding nonnegativity constraints on
investments. See Appendix B and McGrattan (2009) for details.
19the openness parameters needed to match their inward FDI ﬂows are below the U.S. level
in all periods. But, almost all other countries are smaller than the United States. All else
equal, the smaller the country is, the higher is the average inward FDI to GDP since the
domestic stock of technology capital is much smaller than the world stock.
Another noteworthy feature of Figure 10 is the magnitude of the parameters that are
needed to align FDI ﬂows in the model and data. While most countries did became more
open between 1980 and 2005, the levels of σit needed to match the paths of inward FDI
are not that high, but higher values for these parameters would imply FDI ﬂows that are
larger than those reported by the IMF. In the examples of Section 3, I assumed eventual
values of σit at or above 0.9. Only one country in our dataset is above that level.
In Figure 11, I document the performance of the model countries that experience
variations in population and openness consistent with the 50 countries in my dataset.14
This ﬁgure is the analogue of Lucas’s (2009, Figure 2) who compares countries doing a
little and a lot of trade. Here, I distinguish countries doing a little or a lot of inward
FDI. The x-axis shows the initial real GDP per capita relative to the level of the country
parameterized to match U.S. observations. The y-axis is the annual growth rate in per
capita GDP over the period 1980–2005. This rate is relative to the growth rate of the
country parameterized to match U.S. observations. Thus, an annual growth rate of 0
implies that the country is growing at the same rate as the country matched to the United
States. Rates above 0 imply the country is catching up to the U.S. level of per capita GDP
and rates below 0 imply that they are falling behind.
As before, I used a cut-oﬀ for the average FDI to GDP of 2 percent. Other cut-oﬀs
14 The ﬁndings for Singapore with coordinates (.33, 2.1) are not shown so that the results for the others
are more easily seen.
20could be used but the message would be the same: there is no obvious relationship between
lower capital restrictions and economic performance. This is true despite the fact that FDI
does ultimately yield beneﬁts to the host countries.
Another way to demonstrate this is through a cross-country regression of growth on
initial per capita GDP and the ratio of FDI to GDP.15 In Table 3, I report results of such
a regression for both the data and the model. The ﬁrst set of results uses all 50 countries
in the dataset. In this case, we see that the ratio of FDI to GDP is signiﬁcant in the
regression, but the impact is not economically large. This is consistent with Figure 11.
The second set of results drops Ireland and Singapore and, in this case, the impact is small,
both economically and statistically.
The main message of these results is a cautionary one. The lack of a robust positive
relationship between FDI and growth does not necessarily mean that the beneﬁts to FDI
openness are not large. Here, the beneﬁts are large, but one must be careful in drawing
the wrong conclusions from the standard empirical analysis.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I study equilibrium paths of a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium
model as countries become more ﬁnancially integrated. The model is used to reconcile
claims that gains to FDI are large with empirical results that show no robust evidence for
such beneﬁts. In the model, eventual gains to FDI openness are large, but these gains are
not evident until a certain threshold of openness is reached. In fact, researchers would
mistakenly conclude that lower restrictions on capital movements provide few beneﬁts if
15 Many of the studies surveyed by Kose, Prasad, Rogoﬀ, and Wei (2009) include other control variables
about which the model is silent. But, researchers have found that adding them reduces the already
small coeﬃcients on the ratio of FDI to GDP.
21they applied the standard empirical analysis to the data generated from the model. I show
this using a 50-country version of the model and data from the IMF’s Balance of Payments
and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
22Appendix A. Data Sources
IMF and World Bank data were used to construct time series for the ratio of inward FDI to
GDP and real GDP per capita. Fifty countries had complete data available for 1980–2005.
Countries with populations below 2 million were not included because the computation for
very small countries is diﬃcult due to corner solutions for investments. Below, the series
and countries are listed.
Series and Sources:
• Direct investment in reporting country, net, in current US dollars (IMF Balance of
Payments, 4555..9);
• GDP in current U.S. dollars (World Development Indicators, NY.GDP.MKTP.CD);
• GDP in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (World Development Indicators, NY.GDP.PCAP.KD);
• Total population (World Development Indicators, SP.POP.TOTL).
Countries by Region:
• North America: Canada, United States
• Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
• Western Europe: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom
• Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia
• Africa: Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia
• Asia: Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Thailand
• Oceania: Australia, New Zealand
23Appendix B. Computational Methods
In this appendix, I brieﬂy describe the numerical issues that arise in computing equilibria
for the 50-country version of the model. The two main issues are the large dimensionality
of the state space and binding nonnegativity constraints on investment.
The issue of dimensionality arises because the investment decisions of ﬁrms in one
country aﬀect decisions in all other countries. To handle this, I used a parallel computer
and a code that uses the message passing interface (MPI). An initial guess is made for the
vector of interest rates, wages in all countries, and transfers in all countries. If there are
I countries and T time periods, a ﬁxed point must be found for (2I + 1)T − 1 prices and
transfers. The guess is distributed by the master processor (0) to all “slave” processors.
Given prices and transfers, equilibrium quantities are computed on the slave processors,
passed back to processor 0, and the guess for the prices and transfers is updated. A ﬁxed
point in quantities must also be solved at each iteration. This is done with a standard
Newton method, although I have found that analytical derivatives of the Jacobians are
necessary to avoid very slow computations given the large number of unknowns being
computed. A ﬁxed point must be found for (2I+4)T quantities that include consumptions,
labor supplies, bond holdings, investments in technology capital, I investments in tangible
capital, and I investments in plant-speciﬁc intangible capital for each period. In all,
(4I + 5)T − 1 prices and quantities are computed.
The second issue is nonnegativity of investment decisions. As small countries relax
capital restrictions and let technology capital ﬂow in from abroad, the returns to investing
in their own technology capital fall—possibly nonmonotonically, but ultimately to zero.
With a large number of countries in the model it is diﬃcult to apply standard penalty
function methods to avoid negative investments. Instead, I allow for (small) quadratic
adjustment costs in the accumulation equations (2.4)–(2.6) to aid the solution of the ﬁxed
points in prices and quantities. For countries that are close to the corner at the start of
the simulation (which is matched up to 1980 observations), I assume that they are at the
corner and set the appropriate investments to zero.
24References
Aoki Kosuke, Gianluca Benigno, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, 2006, “Adjusting to Capital Account
Liberalization,” Manuscript, LSE and Princeton.
Caballero, Ricardo, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, 2008, “An Equi-
librium Model of ‘Global Imbalances’ and Low Interest Rates,” American Economic
Review, 98: 358–93.
Gourinchas Pierre-Olivier, and Olivier Jeanne, 2006, “The Elusive Gains from Interna-
tional Financial Integration,” Review of Economic Studies, 73: 715–741.
Gourinchas Pierre-Olivier, and Olivier Jeanne, 2008, “Capital Flows to Developing Coun-
tries: The Allocation Puzzle,” Working paper 13602, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
International Monetary Fund, 1980–2009, Balance of Payments, www.imfstatistics.org/bop.
Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, and Shang-Jin Wei, 2009, “Financial
Globalization: A Reappraisal,” IMF Staﬀ Papers, 56(1): 8–62.
Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Ashley D. Taylor, 2009, “Thresholds in the Process of In-
ternational Financial Integration,” Working paper 14916, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Lucas, Robert E., 2009, “Trade and the Diﬀusion of the Industrial Revolution,” American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1): 1–25.
McGrattan, Ellen R., 2009, “Appendix: Transition to FDI Openness,” mimeo, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
McGrattan, Ellen R., and Edward C. Prescott, 2008, “Openness, Technology Capital, and
Development,” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
McGrattan, Ellen R., and Edward C. Prescott, 2009, “Technology Capital and the U.S. Cur-
rent Account,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Mendoza, Enrique, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Victor R´ ıos-Rull, 2009, “Financial Integration,
Financial Deepness and Global Imbalances,” Journal of Political Economy, 117(3):
371–416.
World Bank Group, 1960–2009, World Development Indicators, www.worldbank.org.






Discount factor β .98
Leisure weight ψ 1.32
Tax Rates (%), all i




Technology capital φ 7.0
Tangible capital (1 − φ)αT 21.4
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital (1 − φ)αI 6.5
Labor (1 − φ)(1−αT−αI) 65.1
Depreciation Rates (%)
Technology capital δM 8.0
Tangible capital δT 6.0
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital δI 0
Section 3 Results
Size
Small country, i = s NsA
1− (1− φ)(αT+ αI)
s 1
Big country, i = b NbA
1− (1− φ)(αT+ αI)
b 10
Maximal Degree of Openness
Both countries i = s,b σ∗
it 0.9
Section 4 Results: {Nit,Ait,σit} reported in McGrattan (2009)
a See McGrattan and Prescott (2009) for the motivation behind these parameter choices.
26Table 2. Sensitivity of Results
Percentage Values Relative to Trend in:a
Baseline Higher Higher Higher σ∗
, Lower
(Table 1) Rel. Size σ∗ Lower φ Taxes
Output
t = 1 93.7 89.2 86.3 92.5 94.6
t = 2 82.1 68.3 59.5 79.8 84.7
t = t∗ 82.1 68.3 59.4 79.9 84.7
t = t∗+1 125.6 135.2 142.8 125.5 127.9
t = ∞ 115.0 127.6 138.5 119.5 117.0
GDP
t = 1 102.7 105.1 106.8 101.4 102.3
t = 2 82.1 68.3 59.5 79.8 84.7
t = t∗ 61.2 37.6 23.5 55.4 64.0
t = t∗+1 132.6 143.2 151.1 128.1 134.9
t = ∞ 123.1 136.6 148.2 124.2 125.2
GNP
t = 1 102.7 105.1 106.8 101.4 102.3
t = 2 82.9 69.8 61.4 80.4 85.8
t = t∗ 64.1 32.8 13.0 56.3 82.3
t = t∗+1 102.8 91.8 84.3 96.2 109.6
t = ∞ 96.6 87.5 83.6 93.3 101.7
Labor
t = 1 90.5 83.8 79.8 89.0 91.8
t = 2 82.1 68.3 59.4 79.8 84.7
t = t∗ 82.1 68.3 59.4 79.9 84.8
t = t∗+1 110.5 112.0 113.2 109.7 112.5
t = ∞ 103.3 107.3 109.5 105.4 105.3
Consumption
t = 1 107.9 113.9 117.8 108.9 106.7
t = 2 107.9 113.9 117.8 108.9 106.7
t = t∗ 107.9 113.9 117.8 108.9 106.7
t = t∗+1 108.5 114.3 118.9 109.5 107.3
t = ∞ 109.7 115.2 121.2 110.7 108.5
%FDI/Outputb
t = 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
t = 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
t = t∗ 40.1 60.4 77.7 43.5 49.7
t = t∗+1 7.0 6.7 6.7 7.6 8.9
t = ∞ 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.7 7.0
a Alternatives to baseline are (i) relative size of 20, (ii) σ∗ = .99, (iii) σ∗ = .99, φ = .04, (iv) all tax
rates set to 0 and ψ = 2.1.
b These values are not relative to the historical trend which is 0.
27Table 3. Impact of FDI on Per Capita GDP Growtha
Regression: g=a0+a1 gdp0 + a2 fdi/gdp
g = annual growth in real per capita GDP relative to US, 1980–2005
gdp0 = real per capita GDP relative to US in 1980
fdi/gdp = average ratio of FDI to GDP, 1980–2005
Data Model Data Model
Coeﬃcient I = 50 I = 50 I = 48b I = 48b
a0 −1.15 −.20 −1.00 −.02
(.37) (.07) (.48) (.07)
a1 .50 −.07 .44 −.08
(.62) (.12) (.62) (.09)
a2 .30 .10 .20 .03
(.12) (.02) (.21) (.02)
a Standard errors are in parentheses.




Figure 1. Path of Openness








Figure 2. Output and Labor Relative to Trend in the Small Country





Figure 3. Consumption Relative to Trend in the Small Country
















Figure 4. Capital Stocks Relative to Trend in the Small Country








Figure 5. GDP and GNP Relative to Trend in the Small Country







Figure 6. FDI Investment Relative to Output in the Small Country







Figure 7. GDP Relative to Trend in the Small Country, Varying t∗






Until t > t*
No Restrictions on
Portfolio Investment
Figure 8. Consumption Relative to Trend in the Small Country,
With and Without Restrictions on Portfolio Investment









Until t > t*
Figure 9. GDP Relative to Trend in the Small Country,




























Figure 10. Openness Parameter (σit) at Initial
and Final t in the 50-Country Model













































Note: country with coordinates (.33,2.1) not shown
Figure 11. Performance of Countries with High and Low
Inward FDI Shares in the 50-Country Model
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